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ABSTRACT
In a pure exchange economy with differential information, there may be ex-post
Pareto-dominant core allocations which are not attainable as Rational Expectations
Equilibria because of information verifiability issues. On the other hand, many of
the core allocations in the differential information economy do not seem realistic,
given incentive constraints. This fundamental tension between missed trading op-
portunities and moral hazard will be explored using concepts from cooperative game
theory and financial economics.
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1 Introduction
When two economic agents negotiate the terms of a state-contingent contract, they
prefer the contract to be in terms they can verify. In the presence of asymmetric
information, there are deals that are left on the table because of this verifiabil-
ity constraint. (See, for instance, Fl˚am (2007)). Often, there are allocations in
the core of a differential information economy that are not attainable as a Ratio-
nal Expectations Equilibrium. This result seems to contradict the First Welfare
Theorem, which states that competitive equilibrium, in the absence of externali-
ties, is Pareto-optimal. Here, there are markets with competitive equilibria that
are Pareto-dominated by allocations in the core. In an example presented by Allen
and Yannelis (2001), autarky is the only competitive equilibrium, but it is strictly
Pareto-dominated by allocations in the core. However, this should not be inter-
preted as a refutation of the First Welfare Theorem, because, when information is
distributed asymmetrically, the market is not entirely competitive.
The question then arises what would be an ideal solution concept for differential
information economies. An ideal solution concept should be incentive compatible,
i.e. it should not invite deviations by individuals or coalitions. Thus, it would have
to belong to the core. This suggests that we should look to cooperative games for
such a solution. However, while the core describes allocations that are feasible, and
individually and coalitionally stable, the description of the underlying cooperative
game does not explain how the individuals negotiate their way to a given core so-
lution. In other words, it does not take into account the strategic aspects of the
game arising from the presence of asymmetric information, such as the possibility
of misrepresenting information. The standard core refinements for asymmetric in-
formation economies, such as Wilson’s coarse and fine cores and Yannelis’ private
core, do not adequately address this issue either, as I will show.
I suggest two approaches. One is to modify the concepts of coarse core and the
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private core to take into account the incentive compatibility of each agents’ actions.
I call my modifications of the coarse core and the private core, the locally coarse
core and action-measurable private core, respectively.
The other approach is to to model trading on information as a financial market,
since the invisible hand of the market can often can accomplish what cannot be
accomplished through an analytic solution.
A considerable amount of mathematical machinery is required to study these
issues formally. I present the mathematical preliminaries in Section 2. In Section 3,
I present several core concepts designed for differential information economy and
discuss their strengths and weaknesses. In Section 4, I discuss the approach of
modeling differential information economy as a financial market. In Section 5, I
summarize the results of this paper and present ideas for further research.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Exchange economies, coalitional games, and the core
A pure exchange economy is an economy with no production. I restrict attention to
economies with a finite number of goods and a finite set of agents. Each agent
is characterized by an initial endowment of goods and an increasing, complete,
transitive, continuous, and convex preference relation over the possible bundles of
goods. This preference relation is representable by an increasing, continuous, and
concave, possibly quasi-linear utility function.
Formally, an exchange economy (without uncertainty) is described by:
〈N,C, (ei), (ui)〉 (i ∈ N),
where
• N is the finite set of agents
• C ∈ Z++ is the number of physical goods in the economy, and RC is the
finite-dimensional commodity space
• ei ∈ RC+ is the initial endowment of agent i ∈ N
• ui is the utility function representing agent i’s preferences over RC .
The assumption that the preference relation is increasing assures that every good
in the economy is desirable, and that there are no economic “bads.” Completeness of
preferences ensures that any two bundles of goods can be compared. Transitivity is
required for preference maximization: without transitivity there might be bundles of
goods that have no best elements, such as in the preference cycle A  B  C  A.
Continuity of preferences guarantees the existence of a utility representation, and
rules out lexicographic and other preferences that are hard to deal with mathemat-
ically: it entails that if an agent strictly prefers market basket x to y, there exists a
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number ε > 0 such that, for any market basket z, whenever ‖x− z‖ < ε, the agent
also prefers z to y. Finally, concavity of the utility function ensures that agents
prefer to smooth consumption.
Initial endowments of goods are assumed to be non-negative: an agent cannot,
at least initially, hold a negative amount of a good. In addition, agents are assumed
to behave competitively, i.e., to take prices as given, and to try to maximize their
utility by choosing the best possible bundle of goods they can afford under their
budget constraint.
Utility functions may be, but are not necessarily assumed to be, of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern type. Initially, utility functions are assumed to be strictly
concave, but later I will make use of quasi-linear utility functions with utility linear
(and with the same slope) in the same good for every agent. The good in which
utility is linear can be thought as money, and used to shift utility among the agents,
without affecting the total utility achieved in the economy. This makes the game
associated with the exchange economy a transferable utility (TU) game. Transferable
utility can be used to satisfy incentive constraints and facilitate trade where it
otherwise would not be possible because of information asymmetries or incentive
compatibility issues (Forges et al. 2002), and thus lead to more efficient allocations
in the economy.
Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), I associate the exchange economy
with transferable payoff 〈N,C, (ei), (ui)〉 with the coalitional game 〈N, v〉, where N
is the set of agents.
Let S ∈ 2N\∅ be a nonempty subset of N , termed a coalition.1 Each agent
joining a coalition brings with himself or herself a vector of endowments ei ∈ RC+.
The total resources of the coalition are then represented by a vector
∑
i∈S ei of these
endowments.
1The coalition N of all agents is called the grand coalition.
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A profile of vectors (zi)i∈N is called an allocation when∑
i∈N
zi =
∑
i∈N
ei.
That is, a profile of vectors is an allocation when it is a (re)distribution of the
total endowment in the economy among all the agents. As with endowments, I will
generally require final allocations to be non-negative.
Let v be a function that associates real number, v(S) with each coalition S. Then
v(S), called the value of coalition, represents the total (maximum) payoff available
for division among the members of the coalition S when it forms.
Definition 2.1. Value of coalition (for a TU game):
v : S ∈ 2N\∅→ R
v(S) = max
{∑
i∈S
ui(zi) : zi ∈ RC+ and
∑
i∈S
zi =
∑
i∈S
ei
}
Note that because utility is transferable, v(S) is a scalar. The idea is that we
are only interested in the total payoff the coalition can attain, and assume that
the coalition can divide the transferable utility appropriately among its members to
keep them from defecting. When utility is not transferable (NTU), the value of a
coalition, V (S) is defined as:
Definition 2.2. Value of coalition (for a NTU game):
V : S ∈ 2N\∅→ R ∪ R2 ∪ ... ∪ RN
V (S) =
{
(u(xi))i∈S | (∀i ∈ S)xi ∈ RC+,
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
ei
}
where (xi)i∈S is required to be Pareto-optimal within S.
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That is, the value of coalition in a NTU game is the set of all utility vectors that
are Pareto-optimal and achievable by the coalition on its own, with the additional
condition that the allocation uses up the combined endowments of the agents in the
coalition.2
A core solution is an allocation i.e. a (re)distribution of the total endowment
in the economy among all the agents which satisfies two conditions: feasibility and
stability. Let (zi)i∈S be a proposed allocation of commodities that the members of
the coalition S would get if they join the grand coalition, and let
∑
i∈S ui(zi) be the
total payoff to the coalition S if they join the grand coalition. Feasibility is defined
as follows:
Definition 2.3. Feasibility: An allocation (zi)i∈N is feasible in a TU game if∑
i∈N
ui(zi) = v(N).
The allocation (zi)i∈N is feasible in an NTU game if it is in V (N), as defined in
Definition 2.2.
The stability condition requires that no individual agent or a coalition of agents
S can obtain a higher payoff for themselves if they break away from the grand
coalition. Formally, the definition of stability is:
Definition 2.4. Stability: An allocation (zi)i∈N is stable in a TU game if, for
every S ∈ 2N\∅,
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
ui(zi).
The allocation (zi)i∈N is stable in an NTU game if, for every S ∈ 2N\∅, and every
proposed S-allocation (ẑi)i∈S (i.e., every proposed reallocation of the endowments
of the members of S), either all the members of S are indifferent between (zi) and
2There are alternative definitions. For example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) do not include
the utility or Pareto-optimality in their definition of value for a NTU economy.
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(ẑi), or at least one member of S strictly prefers (zi) to (ẑi). That is,
∀(ẑi)i∈S such that
∑
i∈S
ẑi =
∑
i∈S
ei and (∀i ∈ S)ẑi ≥ 0, if
∃i ∈ S such that ui(ẑi) > ui(zi), then also ∃j ∈ S such that uj(zj) > uj(ẑj).
If the stability condition is violated, the coalition S is said to block the allocation
z, and the allocation z is not in the core.
It is commonly assumed that TU games satisfy a property called superadditivity :3
the addition of agents to coalitions cannot lower the feasible payoffs for the original
coalition members. Formally, for all coalitions S and T , if S ∩ T = ∅, then:
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
2.2 Uncertainty and asymmetric information
To formally describe economies where agents have asymmetric information, two
notions must be introduced: uncertainty and information partitions. The first
economists to introduce uncertainty into the standard economic model were Ar-
row (1953) and Debreu (1959), who considered a world where goods differ in time
or state of the world, and Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b) who introduced outcomes that
depend on choices that nature makes into non-cooperative games. Later, Radner
(1968) added asymmetric information into the Arrow-Debreu model. In this paper,
I follow Radner’s general approach and define:
1. A set of possible states of nature—descriptions of possible future events that
might affect an agent’s utility.
3In the presence of differential information, superadditivity does not always hold (Allen 2006),
but I will assume that games are at least cohesive. Cohesiveness means that the payoff to the
coalition N of all players must be at least as large as the sum of the payoffs of the members of any
partition of N . It ensures that it is optimal for the grand coalition to form.
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2. A collection of subsets of the state space, representing information that the
agent can discern.4
3. A probability measure over (2).
Let Ω symbolize the state space, and let ωi ∈ Ω symbolize an elementary event—
a state of nature—that can take place:
Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, . . .}
The following is an example of a state space:
Example 2.1. Weather conditions in Bergen, Norway, on March 20, 2050:
Ω = {snowy, rainy, sunny, cloudy}
To describe informational asymmetries among agents, a partition Pi of the state
space must be defined for each agent.
Definition 2.5. Partition: A partition P of a set Ω is a collection of subsets of Ω
that is:
Exhaustive: For all ω ∈ Ω, ∃P ∈ P such that ω ∈ P . That is, every element of
the state space must appear in one of the elements (called atoms) of P.
Mutually exclusive: For all P1, P2 ∈ P, if P1 6= P2, then P1 ∩ P2 = ∅. That is,
each element of the state space can appear in only one of the atoms of P.
For example, the collection
{ { sunny, cloudy, snowy}, {rainy} }
4Note that I assume that the state space is finite. Results that apply to finite state spaces
can usually be extended to countable state spaces, as long as each state has a positive probability
(Allen 2006). Introducing an uncountable state space raises mathematical subtleties which are
beyond the scope of this paper.
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is a partition of the state space in Example 2.1, but the collections
{{sunny}, {snowy, rainy}} and {{sunny, cloudy, snowy}, {snowy, rainy}}
are not. They violate the exhaustiveness and the exclusivity conditions, respectively.
Each event (element) of the agent’s information partition Pi represents the states
the agent is able to distinguish from other states. For example, given the partition:
Pi = {{snowy}, {rainy}, {sunny}, {cloudy}}
the agent can tell what the weather is like in Bergen, Norway, on March 20, 2050,
with certainty. But, if the information partition is instead:
Pi = {{snowy, rainy, cloudy}, {sunny}}
the agent can only distinguish fair (sunny) and foul (not sunny) weather.5
To completely describe what each agent knows, we define an information field
for each agent:
Definition 2.6. Field: Given a finite set Ω, a field F is composed of all possible
unions of its atoms, such that:
1. ∅ ∈ F .
2. (Closure under unions) A,B ∈ F ⇒ A ∪B ∈ F .6
3. (Closure under complement) A ∈ F ⇒ Ac ∈ F , where Ac := Ω\A is the
complement of A.
From (2) and (3) and the de Morgan laws it follows that fields are closed under
intersection, while (1) and (3) imply that Ω ∈ F .
5In an alternative framework, used by Vohra (1999), each agent’s private information is repre-
sented by his or her type, and an information state refers to a profile of agents’ types.
6This gives closure under finite unions. Replacing condition (2) by (2′): A1, A2, . . . ∈ F ⇒
∪∞n=1An ∈ F , one obtains closure under countable unions. Such a field is called a σ-field.
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Example 2.2. Generating a field from a partition: Given the state space:
Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}
and the agent i’s partition:
Pi = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}.
the field Fi generated by the agent’s partition is then:
Fi = {∅, {ω1}, {ω2, ω3}, {ω1, ω2, ω3}}.
For example, if the agent’s information partition is:
Pi = {{snowy, rainy, cloudy}, {sunny}}
the field Fi generated by the partition is:
Fi = {∅, {snowy, rainy, cloudy}, {sunny}, {snowy, rainy, cloudy, sunny} } .
To complete the description of the uncertainty and asymmetric information,
one needs to define a probability measure µ : F → R+, representing the agents’
subjective probabilities over the various events in their information fields. µ assigns
non-negative values to each atom in the agents’ information fields. For example,
given the field
Fi = {∅, {snowy, rainy, cloudy}, {sunny}, {snowy, rainy, cloudy, sunny} } ,
The function µ could assign the following probabilities to the events in the field:
Event Probability
µ(∅) 0
µ({snowy, rainy, cloudy}) 0.9
µ({sunny}) 0.1
µ({snowy, rainy, cloudy, sunny}) 1
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The uncertainty in the differential information economy is then fully described
by the abstract probability triple:
(Ω,F , µ)
which is called a probability space, provided µ satisfies the following conditions:
Definition 2.7. Probability Space: (Ω,F , µ) is a probability space if:
Subadditivity: ∀A,B ∈ F , µ(A∪B) ≤ µ(A)+µ(B), and A∩B = ∅⇒ µ(A∪B) =
µ(A) + µ(B).
Probability Measure: µ(Ω) = 1.
The differential information economy is then defined by:
Definition 2.8. Differential Information Economy:
〈Ω, µ, ei,Fi, ui〉 (i ∈ N)
where:
• N is the finite set of agents.
• C ∈ Z+ is the number of physical goods in the economy, and RC is the finite-
dimensional commodity space.
• Fi is the private information field of agent i.
• ei: Ω→ RC+ is the random initial endowment of agent i.
• ui : Ω×RC+ → R is the (possibly state-dependent) utility function, representing
agent i’s preferences over RC .
• µ is the probability measure representing agents’ subjective probabilities at-
tached to their information partitions.7
7I assume, following Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b) that agents have a common prior.
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Defining the core solution for the differential information economy, however, is
more complicated. The standard core concept does not take into account informa-
tional differences among agents, and there is, unfortunately, no universally accepted
core solution concept for such cases. I will present some alternative definitions of the
core adapted to a differential information economy in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4.
2.3 State-contingent contracts and measurability
Once there is uncertainty in the economy, agents have more trading opportunities:
they can now write state-contingent contracts. A state-contingent contract is a
function f : Ω→ X which specifies a contingent claim to a commodity bundle that
may be different in different states of nature. Recalling Example 2.1, an example of
a state-contingent contract would be an agent agreeing to give an ice-cream cone to
another agent on March 20, 2050, in exchange for some consideration, if the weather
in Bergen is sunny, and nothing otherwise.
However, the presence of asymmetric information restricts trade because of the
possibility of misrepresentation and coordination failures. Continuing with the ice-
cream example, if the two agents had entered into the contract in the previous
paragraph, but only the provider of the ice-cream cone could check the weather in
Bergen, Norway on March 20, 2050, the provider could decide to keep the ice-cream
cone to himself or herself and lie to the other agent about the weather. Knowing
this, the recipient would be unlikely to enter into such a contract. Furthermore, if
neither party were able to verify that the weather is sunny in Bergen, Norway on
March 20, 2050, they would fail to coordinate and trade would not occur.
In technical terms, for the agents to be able to write a contract contingent on
weather being sunny in Bergen, Norway on March 20, 2050, the information partition
of both agents must contain the singleton {sunny}, at least by the time anything
is to be exchanged. It does not matter whether the remaining atoms are {rainy,
cloudy, snowy} or {rainy}, {cloudy} and {snowy}, or something else, as long as
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each agent can distinguish sunny from other states of nature. This requirement is
called information adaptedness. Mathematically, information adaptability is related
to the concept of measurability. To clarify: different agents know different things
at different times. Measurability refers to whether the contract depends only on
information in a given field; adaptedness requires that, at every point in time, what
a contract specifies should happen is adapted to what the parties to the contract
know at that point in time.
For example: in the case of the ice-cream cone, suppose the provider is to give
the ice-cream cone to the recipient if the weather in Bergen is sunny on March 20,
2050, and the recipient is to pay the provider if and only if the ice-cream cone is to be
provided. If the payment is supposed to occur before the parties to the contract know
whether the ice-cream cone will be provided (perhaps payment is due one month in
advance), then the contract is non-adapted (also called anticipating) — it requires
the agents to peek into the future before making present decisions. Nevertheless,
once the weather on March 20, 2050 is known to both parties, the contract would
still be measurable to them. So adaptedness takes into consideration the fact that
the information people have available changes over time, and an adapted contract
makes sure that the measurability requirements do not change in ways that conflict
with how the available information evolves.
If a contract is based on information that is verifiable by the agent, it is called a
measurable function. If it is based on information that is not verifiable by the agent,
then it is called a nonmeasurable function. What is measurable from an agent’s
viewpoint is described by the field Fi generated by his or her information partition.
Each element of the field Fi represents a measurable event.
It is generally required that contracts must be based on measurable events, so
the agent is allowed to contract only on the events contained in his information field
Fi. Continuing with Example 2.1, suppose the field Fi generated by the agent’s
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information partition is:
Fi = {∅, {snowy, rainy, cloudy}, {sunny}, {snowy, rainy, cloudy, sunny} } .
The weather events that are measurable to the agent are then: fair (sunny), foul
(snowy, rainy, or cloudy), and any weather. The agent could agree to buy a warm
jacket if the weather is foul ({snowy}, {rainy}, or {cloudy}), an ice-cream cone if
the weather is {sunny}, etc. However, it would be more problematic for the agent
to agree to buy a pair of skis if the weather is {snowy}, because the event {snowy}
is not measurable to him or her.
When a contract is based on information that is nonmeasurable, several issues
related to incentive compatibility and enforceability of the contract arise, as in the
following example:8
Example 2.3. Extended Subaru warranty:
Imagine that you own a Subaru with an extended warranty contract from the deal-
ership. You are driving south on Highway 101 in Shakopee, MN, when suddenly you
hear a loud clunk and see a cloud of smoke coming from under the hood. You pull
over, exit the car, and notice that the the oil has drained from the engine. You have
the car towed to the nearest garage, and the mechanic there tells you that the engine
has been damaged by the oil spilling out, and that it should be replaced. You know
that a new engine should be covered under the extended warranty, so you have the
car towed to your dealership. The dealership assures you that replacing the engine
is not necessary, and that the garage mechanic is simply unfamiliar with the partic-
ular model of the vehicle. You don’t have enough knowledge about car engines to
determine what the actual state of nature is. It is unclear how the situation should
be resolved.
The Subaru example describes a simple differential information economy, where
two agents—the owner and the dealership—have entered into a state-contingent
8This really happened to me.
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contract—the extended warranty. An event described in the contract—damage to
the car—may have been realized, and the question is now whether the contract
should be executed—whether the dealership should perform repairs. The problem
is that one of the parties—the dealership—has verifiable information about the true
state of the world, i.e., whether the car engine is damaged, whereas the second
party—the owner—does not. The contract is, therefore, based on information that
is measurable to the dealership, but nonmeasurable to the owner of the Subaru.
The dealership’s superior information creates a moral hazard, because the deal-
ership has a financial incentive to misrepresent the condition of the engine to the
owner. The issue is similar to the classic lemons problem (Akerlof 1970), where an
informed seller can discern whether the car he or she is offering for sale is a lemon,
but the uninformed buyer can only discern the coarse event consisting of all possible
states. 9
On the other hand, the asymmetric information between the owner and the
dealership creates a trading opportunity for the knowledgeable garage mechanic.
He or she can act as an intermediary between the owner and the dealership—for
instance, as a negotiator or an expert witness in a trial. At the same time, his or her
presence creates additional incentive compatibility issues — we need to also consider
the garage mechanic’s incentives in the situation.
If the contract between the Subaru owner and the dealership would have been
written in terms that would have been verifiable by both parties, perhaps the owner
would have never gotten into such trouble. As Fl˚am (2007) points out, few fancy
being cheated, taken to court, or involved in litigation, and that most people strongly
prefer that future claims be defined in verifiable terms. However, it is also the case
9In fact, the buyer in Akerlof’s story would presumably eventually find out if the car is a
lemon; otherwise, unless the buyer is interested in resale, it is unclear why the buyer should care.
So the lemons problem is really one of adaptedness: whether the car is a lemon is measurable with
respect to what the buyer eventually knows, and with respect to what the seller knows all along.
The problem is that the quality of the car is nonmeasurable with respect to what the buyer can
determine at the time of the sale.
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that if parties can only contract on information they can personally verify, there will
be trading opportunities left on on the table. Information asymmetry is, then, an
endogeneous cause of incompleteness of the market.
In the presence of asymmetric information, there is a fundamental tension be-
tween measurability and incentive compatibility, and trading opportunities. The
core solution concept applied to the differential information economy should then
be sensitive to both of these aspects. It should be information measurable, and in-
dividually and coalitionally incentive compatible, yet not so restrictive as to prevent
trade.
The classical notion of the core does not does not address differences in infor-
mational structures, so we need to consider extensions of the core modified to a
differential information economy, such as the coarse core, the fine core, and the pri-
vate core, described in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. Unfortunately, I find that even
these notions of the core do not satisfactorily address incentive compatibility (or, in
the case of the coarse core, allow enough welfare-improving trade to occur). Instead,
in Section 3.5 I propose my own versions of the private core called locally coarse core
and action-measurable private core based on the requirement of measurability of the
agents’ actions rather their allocations, as in Yannelis’ private core.
2.4 Time dimension and enforceability of contracts
Writing state-contingent contracts adds a time dimension to the model. I restrict
attention to models with three time periods. Initially (ex ante), there is uncertainty
over the state of nature. Agents write contracts, and subsequently the state of
nature is realized. After the state of nature is realized (interim), the agents receive
a signal as to what the event containing the realized state of nature is. The ex post
period then occurs, when the agents carry out the previously made agreements and
consumption takes place (Allen and Yannelis 2001).
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Recalling Example 2.1, if the agent’s information field ex ante is:
Fi = {∅, {snowy, rainy, cloudy}, {sunny}, {snowy, rainy, cloudy, sunny} } .
and the realized state of nature is {snowy}, at the interim stage the agent would
know that:
ω ∈ {snowy, rainy, cloudy}.
i.e., that the realized state of nature is one of the states {rainy}, {cloudy} and
{snowy}.
In some models, agents learn the true state of nature at the ex post stage,
whereas in others they do not.10 If they do, incentive and measurability constraints
are irrelevant, and the only remaining issue is that of enforceability of contracts
(de Clippel 2006). In contract theory, the problem of enforceability of contracts
at the ex post stage is usually dealt with in one of two ways. Either the contract
includes an infinite penalty for misrepresentation, or it is assumed that there is an
independent third party who can enforce contracts.11
However, the assumption of perfect enforceability in the context of asymmetric
information is problematic: if the agents can trust that their contracts will be en-
forced regardless of what they know, it is not clear why the agents should restrict
themselves only to contracts based on terms measurable to them. The addition of
the asymmetric information to the model then becomes irrelevant.
Therefore, in this paper, I consider only the latter case: when the true state of
nature is not revealed to all the agents, even ex post. Contracts must then designed
so that the better-informed parties have incentive to reveal their information; oth-
erwise contracting opportunities are limited to what every party can discern. In
10If the agents do not learn anything in the ex post stage that they do not already know in the
ex ante stage, then the model can be collapsed into one with two dates, as the interim stage can
be considered equivalent to the ex post stage.
11There are models in which verifiability of contracts is imperfect, for example in the costly state
verification literature due to Townsend (1979) and in the tax compliance literature (Reinganum
and Wilde 1986). For papers where verifiability is endogenous, see for example Ishiguro (2002) or
Kvaløy and Olsen (2008)
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other words, contracts may depend on the private information of the agents only
if it gives the right incentives to the agents to reveal their information truthfully
(Vohra 1999). Any core solution concept I propose must be in accordance with the
revelation principle. I show that this is the case with both the locally coarse core
(trivially) and the private action measurability core.
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3 Core concepts
3.1 General
As discussed in the previous Section, the final allocation of goods in a differential
information economy should satisfy several criteria. It should be feasible, efficient,
sensitive to the informational differences among agents, fully incentive compatible,
and individually and coalitionally rational, i.e. stable against any deviations by
individuals or a group of agents. In addition, the solution concept must not be too
restrictive to prevent welfare-improving trades from being made.
That is, we should find the most efficient solution under the following constraints:
Definition 3.1. Pure exchange non-disposal constraints:
(∀i ∈ N)(∀ω ∈ Ω)
∑
i∈N
zi(ω) =
∑
i∈N
ei(ω)
where z is an allocation.
Definition 3.2. Non-negativity constraints:
(∀i ∈ N)(∀ω ∈ Ω)zi(ω) ≥ 0
Definition 3.3. Individual rationality (IR) constraints:
(∀i ∈ N)(∀ω ∈ Ω)E[ui(zi)] ≥ E[ui(ei)]
Definition 3.4. Coalitional rationality (CR) constraint:
∀(ẑi)i∈S such that (∀ω ∈ Ω)
∑
i∈S
ẑi(ω) =
∑
i∈S
ei(ω) and
(∀i ∈ S)(∀ω ∈ Ω)ẑi(ω) ≥ 0,
whenever ∃i ∈ S with E[ui(ẑi)] > E[ui(zi)],
then also ∃j ∈ S such that E[uj(zj)] > E[uj(ẑj)].
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In the TU case, this simplifies to
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
E[ui(zi)],
where v(S) in Definition 2.1 is modified to be the maximized sum of expected utili-
ties.
I illustrate these constraints and different solution concepts using the following
example from Allen and Yannelis (2001):
Example 3.1. Three-agent game with a destitute agent:
Agents : i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}
Goods : There is only one good, x.
State space : Ω = {a, b, c}
Uncertainty : µ(a) = µ(b) = µ(c) = 1/3.
Endowments :
e1(ω) =
 20, if ω ∈ {a, b}0, if ω = c
e2(ω) =
 20, if ω ∈ {a, c}0, if ω = b
e3(ω) = 0,∀ω.
Preferences : u(x) = x1/2.
Information fields:
F1 = {∅,Ω, {a, b}, {c}}
F2 = {∅,Ω, {a, c}, {b}}
F3 = {∅,Ω, {b, c}, {a}}
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My objective is to find an allocation:
(∀ω ∈ Ω)z = (z1(ω), z2(ω), z3(ω))
that is in the core and satisfies the following constraints:
Pure exchange non-disposal constraints:
z1(a) + z2(a) + z3(a) = e1(a) + e2(a) + e3(a) = 40 (1)
z1(b) + z2(b) + z3(b) = e1(b) + e2(b) + e3(b) = 20 (2)
z1(c) + z2(c) + z3(c) = e1(c) + e2(c) + e3(c) = 20 (3)
Non-negativity constraints:
(∀i ∈ N)(∀ω ∈ Ω)zi(ω) ≥ 0 (4)
Individual rationality (IR) constraints:
E[u1(z1)] ≥ E[u1(e1)] (5)
E[u2(z2)] ≥ E[u2(e2)] (6)
E[u3(z3)] ≥ E[u3(e3)] = 0 (7)
Coalitional rationality (CR) constraint:
(∀i, j ∈ N) if, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ẑi(ω) + ẑj(ω) = ei(ω) + ej(ω) for some ẑi, ẑj ≥ 0,
then whenever E[ui(zi)] < E[ui(ẑi)],
we must have E[uj(zj)] > E[uj(ẑj)]. (8)
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3.2 The rational expectations equilibrium
Since agents are maximizing their utility under uncertainty, the natural place to
start looking for a solution concept is in the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(REE). However, in this case REE is not the ideal solution concept. When agents
have complete information, trade is efficient, and agents arrive at an equilibrium,
which is also a core solution (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). But when information
is asymmetric, agents in Example 3.1 cannot make the welfare-improving trades,
and the only solution under REE is autarky, even though there are several (in fact,
infinitely many) allocations in the core that Pareto-dominate autarky.
The endowments and their expected utilities are as follow:
e1 = (20, 20, 0) e2 = (20, 0, 20) e3 = (0, 0, 0)
E[u1(e1)] =
1
3
√
20 +
1
3
√
20 +
1
3
√
0 =
2
√
20
3
=
4
√
5
3
E[u2(e2)] =
4
√
5
3
(by symmetry).
E[u3(e3)] = 0
A more efficient allocation would be:
z1 = (16, 16, 4) z2 = (16, 4, 16) z3 = (8, 0, 0)
This allocation satisfies the pure exchange non-disposal constraints (1), (2), and (3):
State {a} : 16 + 16 + 8 = 40
State {b} : 16 + 4 + 0 = 20
State {c} : 4 + 16 + 0 = 20
It also satisfies the Individual Rationality (IR) constraints (5), (6) and (7):
E[u1(16, 16, 4)] =
1
3
√
16 +
1
3
√
16 +
1
3
√
4 =
10
3
> E[u1(e1)] =
4
√
5
3
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E[u2(16, 4, 16)] =
10
3
> E[u2(e2)] =
4
√
5
3
(by symmetry).
E[u3(8, 0, 0)] =
1
3
√
8 +
1
3
√
0 +
1
3
√
0 =
2
√
2
3
> E[u3(e3)] = 0
as well as the non-negativity constraints (4), since none of the agents receives a
negative allocation in any state. Lastly, since no pair of agents can improve upon
this allocation, the allocation satisfies the coalitional rationality constraint (8). The
allocation
z1 = (16, 16, 4) z2 = (16, 4, 16) z3 = (8, 0, 0)
is, therefore, in the core.12
The situation is analogous to incomplete markets in financial economics: in
incomplete financial markets, the equilibrium allocations are almost never efficient.
Consider the extreme case, similar to the three-agent game here, suggested by van
Zandt (2004), of a market in which there are no financial assets and state-contingent
trade is not possible. This would only be efficient if the original endowments were
Pareto-optimal and there would be no gains from trade.
However, the allocation z1 = (16, 16, 4), z2 = (16, 4, 16), z3 = (8, 0, 0) is not a ra-
tional expectations equilibrium. To see this, consider agent 1’s objective function:13.
maxE[u(z)] =
[
µ(a)(z(a))
1
2 + µ(b)(z(b))
1
2 + µ(c)(z(c))
1
2
]
= max
[
1
3
(z(a))
1
2 +
1
3
(z(b))
1
2 +
1
3
(z(c))
1
2
]
s.t. paz(a) + pbz(b) + pcz(c) = 20pa + 20pb
Dividing all the terms by pa, the Lagrangian becomes:
max
z(a),z(b),z(c)
L =
1
3
[
z(a)
1
2 + z(b)
1
2 + z(c)
1
2
]
−λ
[
−20− 20pb
pa
+ z(a) +
pb
pa
z(b) +
pc
pa
z(c)
]
12Note that the core is infinitely large and contains autarky, allocations where agent 3 gets all
but ε of the surplus over autarky from agents 1 and 2, etc.
13I suppress the subscripts indicating the agent to enhance readability
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The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂z(a)
= 0⇒ z(a) = 1
36λ2
∂L
∂z(b)
= 0⇒ z(b) =
(
pa
pb
)2
1
36λ2
In a competitive equilibrium, provided that pa, pb 6= 0,
z(b) =
(
pa
pb
)2
(z(a))
∂L
∂z(c)
= 0⇒ z(c) =
(
pa
pc
)2
1
36λ2
=
(
pa
pc
)2
z(a)
If Agent 1’s problem has (16,16,4) as an optimal choice, then:
z(a) = z(b) = 16⇒ 16 =
(
pa
pb
)2
z(a)⇒ pa = pb
z(c) =
(
pa
pc
)2
z(a)⇒ 4 = 16
(
pa
pc
)2
⇒ pa
pc
=
1
2
⇒ pc = 2pa
To solve for the equilibrium allocations, consider agent 2’s objective function:
max
[
1
3
(z(a))
1
2 +
1
3
(z(b))
1
2 +
1
3
(z(c))
1
2
]
s.t. paz(a) + pbz(b) + pcz(c) = 20pa + 20pc
Substituting pa = pb and pc = 2pa in the budget constraint and dividing all the
terms by pa, we obtain the following version of the budget constraint:
z(a) +
pb
pa
z(b) +
pc
pa
z(c) = 20 + 20
pc
pa
Since pa = pb,
pb
pa
= 1; and since pc = 2pa,
pc
pa
= 2. So agent 2’s problem simplifies
to:
max
z(a),z(b),z(c)
L =
1
3
[
z(a)
1
2 + z(b)
1
2 + z(c)
1
2 − λ(z(a) + z(b) + 2z(c)− 60)
]
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The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂z(a)
= 0⇒ z(a) = 1
36λ2
∂L
∂z(b)
= 0⇒ z(b) = 1
36λ2
= z(a)
∂L
∂z(c)
= 0⇒ z(c) = 1
144λ2
=
1
4
z(a)
∂L
∂λ
= 0⇒ z(a) = 80
3
From this follows that: z(b) = 80
3
and z(c) = 20
3
. This means that at any prices
where agent 1 consumes (16, 16, 4), agent 2 consumes (80
3
, 80
3
, 20
3
) 6= (16, 4, 16).
There are, therefore, no prices where agents 1 and 2 could choose the allocation
z1 = (16, 16, 4), z2 = (16, 4, 16) and be optimizing.
The above result depends on dividing agent 1’s objective function by pa. It is
conceivable that agents could set pb = pc and pa = 0. However, if this were to happen
in equilibrium, the demand for z(a) would be infinite, unless the agents believed the
probability of the state a also to be zero. But since µ(a) = 1
3
, the expectation that
a occurs with probability zero is not rational. Hence, the only possible equilibrium
prices where agent 1 consumes (16,16,4) and agent 2 consumes (16,4,16) cannot
involve rational expectations.
It is clear, then, that for this example, REE is not the ideal solution concept,
at least if we believe that the allocation (16,16,4), (16,4,16), (8,0,0) is plausible.
It therefore makes sense to look at different core solution concepts designed for
economies with asymmetric information. Two of these are the coarse core and fine
core by Wilson (1978). I turn to these next.
25
3.3 Fine core and coarse core
Wilson (1978) considered two basic cases of how agents in an economy can share
information: one where the coalition pools its information (the fine core), and one
where the coalition only uses information common to all of its members (the coarse
core). Applied to the grand coalition, the corresponding fields are the fine field and
the coarse field:
Definition 3.5. Fine field: The fine field in an economy with differential informa-
tion is defined by the join ∨i∈NFi, which is the field generated by the union ∪i∈NFi
of agents’ information fields.
A join operator ∨ is similar to a union operator but preserves the field property
(see Definition 2.6). For example, given the information fields from Example 3.1,
F1 = {∅,Ω, {a, b}, {c}}
F2 = {∅,Ω, {a, c}, {b}}
the union of F1 and F2:
F1 ∪ F2 = {∅,Ω, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}}
is not a field, but the join of F1 and F2 is. The join is obtained from the union by
adding the missing elements {a} and {b,c}:
F1 ∨ F2 = {∅,Ω, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c} {b, c}}.
The join represents agents’ pooled information.
Definition 3.6. Coarse field: The coarse field in an economy with differential
information is defined by the the meet ∧i∈NFi, which is a field generated by the
intersection of agents’ information fields ∩i∈NFi.
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The meet operator ∧ is equal to the intersection, and preserves the field property.
For example, given the information fields from Example 3.1,
F1 = {∅,Ω, {a, b}, {c}}
F3 = {∅,Ω, {b, c}, {a}}
the intersection of F1 and F3 equals the meet of F1 and F3:
F1 ∩ F3 = F1 ∧ F3 = {∅,Ω}
The meet represents the information common to all agents in the economy.
The two opposite extremes of information sharing are then the null communica-
tion system, Fi(i ∈ N), where each agent only knows his or her private information
and communicates nothing, and the full communication system, ∨i∈NFi(i ∈ N),
where all the information fields are common information.
Wilson’s fine and coarse cores are then core solutions that satisfy the normal
feasibility and stability conditions but allow for information sharing either using the
fine or coarse field, respectively. Under the fine core, agents can trade on events in
the pooled information, whereas in the coarse core, agents can only trade on the
information that all of the agents have in common.
It is easy to see that under the fine core, incentive compatibility and moral
hazard issues arise. If the agents do not have incentive to share their information
truthfully, they will lie as long as it is advantageous for them to do so. For instance,
if we recall the ice-cream example from Section 2.3, an agent could promise to give
another agent an ice-cream cone in exchange for some consideration, if the weather
is sunny, but then lie and tell him the weather is, in fact, rainy.
It is also easy to see that under the coarse core, trade will be limited. In the
three-agent game with a destitute agent, the only information partitions the agents
have in common are the empty set, ∅, and the whole state space, Ω. Therefore, the
agents can only write incentive-compatible and measurable contracts on the whole
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state space. There are no welfare-improving trades that the agents can make under
such conditions so the only allocation in the core is autarky. The limitations of the
coarse core are illustrated even more dramatically by the following modification of
the three-agent game:
Example 3.2. Three-agent game with a destitute agent (Agents 1 and 2
with complete information; agent 3 with no information):
This game is in all other aspects similar to Example 3.1 except that agents 1 and
2 have complete information, and agent 3 has no information:
F1 = F2 = {∅,Ω, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}}
F3 = {∅,Ω}
The coarse field ∩i∈NFi equals just {∅,Ω}, and the only solution in the coarse
core is then autarky, despite two of the agents having complete information, and
therefore not needing agent 3 to intermediate.
The fine and coarse cores illustrate the fundamental tension that arises in the
economy in the presence of asymmetric information. While the coarse core is gener-
ally nonempty, trade based on information that everybody can discern is necessarily
limited. The fine core, on the other hand, tends to be empty but offers more trading
possibilities, if the agents could somehow coordinate reliably and avoid issues of
moral hazard (Wilson 1978).14
Thus, a more nuanced core solution concept is desirable. Such a solution concept
should allow trade in larger numbers of cases than the coarse core, but avoid the
incentive and rationality constraint issues with the fine core. One such possibility is
the private core suggested by Yannelis (1991).
14Numerous authors since Wilson have addressed this question. Forges et al. (2002) proved that
although the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty, with quasi-linearity (i.e., transfer-
able utility), it is generally nonempty. Infinite-dimensional economies have been shown to yield
nonempty ex ante incentive compatibile cores, see Allen (2006) for proof that the interim incentive
compatible coarse core is nonempty. However, in the case of a finite-dimensional economy and
a finite state space the issues still remain. For results with infinetely many agents, see Sun and
Yannelis (2008).
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3.4 The private core
The private core is defined as the set of all feasible and private information mea-
surable allocations which cannot be dominated, in terms of expected utility, by any
coalition’s feasible and private information measurable net trades (Yannelis 1991).
The requirement for measurability adds another constraint to the model:
Definition 3.7. Measurability constraint: Agents can only trade on events they
are able to discern.
In the context of the Allen-Yannelis Example 3.1, this means that:
• Agent 1 can only trade on the events Ω, {a, b}, {c}.
• Agent 2 can only trade on the events Ω, {a, c}, {b}.
• Agent 3 can only trade on the events Ω, {b, c}, {a}.
Consider a model containing three time periods. Initially (ex ante), there is
uncertainty over the state of nature. Agents write contracts, and subsequently the
state of nature is realized. After the state of nature is realized (interim), the agents
receive a signal as to what the event containing the realized state of nature is. The ex
post period then occurs, when the agents carry out the previously made agreements
and consumption takes place (Allen and Yannelis 2001).
Let A(ω̂) ∈ Fi be the event that agent i observes when ω̂ is the realized state.
The ex ante and interim expected utilities of agent i of state-dependent consumption
zi are then respectively given by
E[ui(zi)] =
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω, zi(ω))µ(ω), and
E[ui(zi)|ω ∈ A(ω̂)] = 1
µ(A(ω̂))
∑
ω∈A(ω̂)
ui(ω, zi(ω))µ(ω).
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For example, suppose that the realized state is a. For agent 1, A(a) = {a, b}.
Now µ(a) = µ(b) = µ(c) = 1
3
, and µ(A) = 2
3
. So the ex ante expected utility for
agent 1 is
E[ui(zi)] =
1
3
[u1(a, z1(a)) + u1(b, z1(b)) + u1(c, z1(c))] ,
and the interim expected utility for agent 1 is
E[ui(zi)|ω ∈ {a, b}] = 12
3
[
u1(a, z1(a))
1
3
+ u1(b, z1(b))
1
3
]
=
1
2
[u1(a, z1(a)) + u1(b, z1(b))] .
Allocation (zi)i∈N is in the private core if the following three conditions hold:
• Measurability: Each zi is Fi-measurable
• Feasibility: ∑i∈N zi = ∑i∈N ei
• Stability: For every coalition S, whenever (ẑi)i∈S satisfies
(∀ω ∈ Ω)
∑
i∈S
ẑi(ω) =
∑
i∈S
ei(ω) and (∀i ∈ S)(∀ω ∈ Ω)ẑi(ω) ≥ 0,
it is the case that, for each ω̂ ∈ Ω,
(∃i ∈ S)E[ui(ẑi)|ω ∈ Ai(ω̂)] > E[ui(zi)|ω ∈ Ai(ω̂)]
⇒ (∃j ∈ S)E[uj(zj)|ω ∈ Aj(ω̂)] > E[uj(ẑj)|ω ∈ Aj(ω̂)].
In other words, the stability condition requires that, if any potential breakaway
coalition can achieve something that one of its members prefers to the core allocation,
then there is another member of the same coalition who prefers the core allocation.
This gives us the interim private core. The ex ante private core does not depend
on the realized state of nature, so the ex ante stability condition is:
(∃i ∈ S)E[ui(ẑi)] > E[ui(zi)] ⇒ (∃j ∈ S)E[uj(zj)] > E[uj(ẑj)].
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Allen and Yannelis (2001) state that the private core is not suspectible to the
criticism of the traditional rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, they
argue that while the rational expectations equilibrium does not provide an explana-
tion as to how prices reflect the information asymmetries in the economy, the private
core is sensitive to agent’s information state and allows a better-informed agent to
have an advantage over worse-informed agents in trading.
However, while allocations in the private core have a number of desirable prop-
erties — they satisfy individual and coalitional rationality constraints, for instance
— two issues remain. The first is whether the allocations in the private core are in-
centive compatible in the full sense of the term. The second is that, while the agents
might prefer to stay with the core allocation once they get there, it is not clear
exactly how they would negotiate or trade with each other to get there. Therefore,
I propose adding the following constraint to the model:
Definition 3.8. Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint: Misrepresenting the
state cannot be more profitable than telling the truth.
Returning to Example 3.1, the private core allocation:
x1 = (16, 16, 4) x2 = (16, 4, 16) x3 = (8, 0, 0)
does not satisfy the IC constraint, because the transfers between agents 2 and 3,
and between agents 1 and 3, are based on information that is not verifiable by agent
3. These incentive compatibility issues arise when the state is b or c. At the interim
stage, if the state is b,
• Agent 1 knows that: ω ∈ {a, b}
• Agent 2 knows that: ω = b
• Agent 3 knows that: ω ∈ {b, c}
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Agent 1 has an incentive to misrepresent the state as c to agent 3, because in
state c, agent 1 receives four units from agent 3, whereas in state b he or she owes
four units to agent 3. Agent 2, on the other hand, knows the state is b and will
also claim his or her four units from agent 3. Agent 3 has cannot tell which of
the agents 1 and 2 is lying, because his or her private information does not reveal
whether the state is b or c: the state b is not privately measurable to him or her.
Agent 3’s contract with agent 1 stipulates different behaviors in states b and c, even
though agent 3 cannot distinguish between states b and c, and this is problematic.
Therefore, agent 2 needs to be present when agents 1 and 3 meet to tell 3 which
state they are in. But this would mean pooling information, as in the fine core,
with its associated incentive compatibility problems. A similar problem arises with
agents 2 and 3, and state c.
Allen and Yannelis (2001) propose a notion they call Transfer Coalitionally
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (TCBIC) to address this issue:
Definition 3.9. Transfer Coalitionally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
(TCBIC):
A feasible allocation z is TCBIC if it is not the case that for a coalition S, states a, b
with a 6= b and (∀i /∈ S) a ∈ A(b) and a net trade vector mi such that
∑
i∈Smi = 0,
and, for all i ∈ S,
1
µ(A(a))
∑
c∈A(a)
ui(c, ei(c) + zi(b)− ei(b) +mi)(µ(c)) >
1
µ(A(a))
∑
c∈A(a)
ui(c, zi(c))(µ(c)).
The TCBIC condition requires that there is no coalition whose members can
agree, possibly through making some transfer payments, to misrepresent its infor-
mation. If the true state is a and everyone outside a given coalition cannot distin-
guish states a and b, then the TCBIC condition requires that there is no collective
incentive to misrepresent the state as b.
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The problem is that the TCBIC only remedies situations where the lie cannot
be detected by any of the agents. It does not address a situation where one agent
is able to detect the lie but another is not. In the context of the Allen-Yannelis
example, suppose the realized state of nature is b. Agent 1 will then misrepresent
the state to agent 3 as c. Agent 2 can catch agent 1 lying but agent 3 cannot. The
TCBIC does not address the question, because it only rules out lies that no-one can
detect, and the incentive compatibility problem remains.
The incentive compatibility issues discussed here have lead many economists to
model differential information economies as a noncooperative or hybrid games, or by
representing the agent’s information partitions as types. In these models, incentive
compatibility refers to an agent’s willingness to report his type truthfully. Obviously,
with such a mechanism, only contracts that are self-enforcing can be implemented.
The set of such contracts is known as the set of incentive compatible contracts. See
Vohra (1999).
Rather than explore all or even most of these attempts, which would be impossi-
ble within the scope of this paper, I show that when utility in Example 3.3 is made
quasi-linear by the addition of a linear good y, which can be used as money, the
incentive constraints can be satisfied by appropriate transfers among agents. Quasi-
linear utility has been suggested by many authors, such as Forges et al. (2002)
to increase trading opportunities in the economy and allow for more equilibria to
emerge. This approach, while satisfactory in some respects, is not unproblematic in
others.
3.5 Locally coarse core and action-measurable private core
There are two ways one might try to deal with the incentive compatibility problem.
One way would be to reconsider the coarse core. The second would be to redefine
the private core to take account into the incentive compatibility constraints.
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I call core allocations that the agents can reach by bilateral, measurable ex-
changes between each other, using only information that is in the coarse field be-
tween them, the locally coarse core. Allowing this type of exchange, and modifying
the Example 3.1 by giving agent 3 complete information about the state of nature
at the interim stage, the three agents can trade themselves into the allocation:
x1 = (16, 16, 4) x2 = (16, 4, 16) x3 = (8, 0, 0)
without violating incentive compatibility constraints.
Example 3.3. Three-agent game with a destitute agent (Third agent with
complete information):
This game is in all other aspects similar to Example 3.1 except that agent 3 has
complete information about the state of nature:
F3 = {∅,Ω, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}}.
The coarse field between agents 1 and 3 is:
F1 ∩ F3 = F1 ∧ F3 = {∅,Ω, {a, b}, {c}} = F1.
and the coarse field between agents 2 and 3 is:
F2 ∩ F3 = F1 ∧ F3 = {∅,Ω, {a, c}, {b}} = F2.
At the ex ante stage, agent 3 proposes the following contract to agents 1 and 2:
• In event {a, b}, agent 1 gives 4 to agent 3.
• In state c, agent 3 gives 4 (received from agent 2) to agent 1.
• In event a, c, agent 2 gives 4 to agent 3.
• In state b, agent 3 gives 4 (received from agent 1) to agent 2.
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These exchanges lead to the allocation:
x1 = (16, 16, 4) x2 = (16, 4, 16) x3 = (8, 0, 0)
This allocation is feasible, and Pareto-efficient. Agent 3 playes the role of an
intermediary, using his or her superior information to facilitate trade between agents
1 and 2 (Allen and Yannelis 2001). The exchanges are based on events in the
coarse field between agents 1 and 3, and agents 2 and 3, so they satisfy incentive
compatibility and measurability. No individual agent or a pair of agents has incentive
to deviate, so this allocation is in the core. By contrast, in the original example,
where agent 3 had incomplete information about the state of nature at the interim
stage, the locally coarse core is a single point (autarky).
The other way to deal with the incentive compatibility problem is to refine the
notion of the private core. I propose changing the focus from the measurability of
the agents’ allocations to the measurability of their actions. This makes the private
core an action-measurable private core. The idea behind the action-measurable
private core is that instead of the agent’s allocation being required to be privately
measurable, it is his or her actions that need to be privately measurable. In other
words, the focus in the action-measurable private core is on requiring agents to
know what they are supposed to give to someone else in each state, rather than on
insisting that they know what they are supposed to receive as their final allocations.
For this approach to work, each agent must have incentive to report honestly and
disclose what he or she knows. That is, the contracts must be incentive compatible.
This is achieved by adding a second, linear good y to the utility function. The
good y is then used as monetary transfers among the agents to satisfy incentive
constraints. I show that as long as there is a sufficient amount of good y in the
economy, the agents can trade to a private core allocation. Unfortunately, I also
find that in the three-agent example, the proposed allocation is not stable — agents
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1 and 2 have incentive to break away and form their own coalition. So the action-
measurable core may not be the ideal solution for the three agents’ problem either,
at least if the goal is to explain how agent 3 can act as an intermediary.
Example 3.4. Three-agent game with a destitute agent (TU and two
goods):
Agents : i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}
Goods : There are two goods, x and y
State space : Ω = {a, b, c}
Uncertainty : µ(a) = µ(b) = µ(c) = 1/3.
Endowments :
Agent State a State b State c
1 (20, 10) (20, 10) (0, 10)
2 (20, 10) (0, 10) (20, 10)
3 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Information fields:
F1 = {∅,Ω, {a, b}, {c}}
F2 = {∅,Ω, {a, c}, {b}}
F3 = {∅,Ω, {b, c}, {a}}
Preferences : u(x) = x1/2 + y.
The utility is quasi-linear: linear in the good y and strictly concave in good x.15
Each agent can use the linear good y as transfers m to other agents in order to
satisfy incentive constraints. Let
mkij(ω)
15Interestingly, the results obtained in this section do not go through if, instead of the second
good y, state a utility is made linear.
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be the transfer that agent i promises to make to agent j of good k in state ω. For
example,
m213(a)
is the number of units of the y good that agent 1 transfers to agent 3 in state a.
Each mkij(ω) ≥ 0, which is to say that the mkij(·) are not net transfers, but rather
gross payments.
I consider a case where agents make bilateral contracts with each other ex ante
(rather than try to arrive at a multilateral contract at once). I relax the assumption
of nonnegativity temporarily, and allow agent 3 to sell short, i.e. hold a negative
position of a good, as long as he or she is not left holding a negative allocation in
the end. The negative position is interpreted as an I.O.U. on the good.
First, assume that agents 1 and 3 sign a contract which stipulates the following
transfers:
• Agent 3 gives 4 units of the x good to agent 1 in all states:
(∀ω ∈ Ω)m131(ω) = 4.
• Agent 1 gives 8 units of the x good to agent 3, provided the event {a, b} occurs.
In event {c}, agent 1 owes 0 units of the x good to agent 3:
m113(a) = m
1
13(b) = 8 m
1
13(c) = 0.
The net effect of this scheme is to leave agent 1 with (16, 16, 4) of the x good, and
to give agent 3 (4, 4,−4) of the x good. So agent 3 takes a short position on the x
good in state c, which a trade with someone else—presumably agent 2, since no one
else is left—must cover.
Here, agent 3’s action, “give 4 units of x to agent 1,” is privately measurable for
3, and agent 1’s action, “give 8 units of x to agent 3 if the event {a, b} occurs, and
nothing otherwise,” is privately measurable to 1. So both parties know what they
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must do in order to honor their bargain. Transfers of the y good can now be used
to make the contracts incentive compatible.16
There is no concern that agent 3 might lie, as the contract specifies the same
action m131(ω) in every state. And it is infeasible for agent 1 to lie in the event {c},
at least if I assume that 3 is the only intermediary. If agents 1 and 2 only trade with
3, and not directly with each other, then only 3 can feasibly (temporarily) hold a
short position. I therefore restrict attention to incentive compatibility for agent 1
in event {a, b}.
If agent 1 observes that the event is {a, b}, then his or her expected utility from
honest reporting is
u(e1(a) +m31(a)−m13(a)) · µ(a)
µ({a, b}) + u(e1(a) +m31(b)−m13(a)) ·
µ(b)
µ({a, b})
=
(
10 +m231(a)−m213(a) +
√
20 +m131(a)−m113(a)
)(
1/3
2/3
)
+(
10 +m231(b)−m213(a) +
√
20 +m131(b)−m113(a)
)(
1/3
2/3
)
.
Agent 1’s transfers must be the same in states a and b, so I label these (m113(a),m
2
13(a))
in either case. Under the terms of the contract, m113(a) = 8 andm
1
31(a) = m
1
31(b) = 4.
So agent 1’s expected utility becomes
1
2
(
20 +m231(a)− 2m213(a) +m231(b) + 2
√
16
)
= 14 +
m231(a) +m
2
31(b)
2
−m213(a).
The only state in which there is potential for agent 1 to lie is c, so I guess that there
is an incentive compatible contract with m231(a) = m
2
31(b) = m
2
13(a) = 0. In that
case, the expected utility for agent 1 from honest reporting in event {a, b} is 14.
16This is similar in spirit to Fl˚am (2007), where agents have random bilateral meetings and
transfer goods in ways that increase their combined utilities. Fl˚am notes that, if one agent’s
marginal utility is higher than the other’s in every good, then the prescribed transfers would
require some sort of monetary compensation. His paper abstracts from how this compensation
occurs, as his interest is in other issues (specifically, the long-run behavior of a dynamic model).
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If agent 1 lies and reports the event as {c}, one of two equally likely things occurs.
Either the true state is a, in which case agent 3 detects the lie, or the true state is
b, in which case the lie is successful. If agent 3 catches agent 1 lying, the contract
is void, and both parties end up with what they had under autarky. Otherwise, the
agents execute the terms of the contract in the reported state c.
Agent 1’s expected utility of lying is therefore
u(e1(a)) · µ(a)
µ({a, b}) + u(e1(a) +m31(b)−m13(c)) ·
µ(b)
µ({a, b})
=
1
2
(
10 + 2
√
5 + 10 + 2
√
6 +m231(b)−m213(c)
)
.
Assuming m231(b) = 0, the expected utility for 1 of lying becomes
10 +
√
5 +
√
6− m
2
13(c)
2
.
For the contract to be incentive compatible, it must be at least as good for 1 to tell
the truth as it is for 1 to lie:
10 +
√
5 +
√
6− m
2
13(c)
2
≤ 14
m213(c) ≥ 2
(√
5 +
√
6− 4
)
(≈ 1.37).
So let m213(c) = 2(
√
5 +
√
6− 4). Agent 1 is then willing to report honestly in event
{a, b}.
By an analogous argument, assume that agents 2 and 3 agree that, in every
state, agent 3 will give 4 units of the x good and none of the y good to agent 2. In
exchange, agent 2 will give 8 units of the x good and none of the y good to agent 3
in the event {a, c}, and 2(√5 +√6− 4) units of the y good and none of the x good
in event {b}. The final scheme of transfers is shown in the following table:
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Transfer State a State b State c
m13 (8, 0) (8, 0) (0, 2(
√
5 +
√
6− 4))
m23 (8, 0) (0, 2(
√
5 +
√
6− 4)) (8, 0)
m31 (4, 0) (4, 0) (4, 0)
m32 (4, 0) (4, 0) (4, 0)
Table 1: Transfers
Everyone’s action is now privately measurable in every state, and the final allo-
cations become
Agent State a State b State c
1 (16, 10) (16, 10) (4, 10− 2(√5 +√6− 4))
2 (16, 10) (4, 10− 2(√5 +√6− 4)) (16, 10)
3 (8, 0) (0, 10− 2(√5 +√6− 4)) (0, 10− 2(√5 +√6− 4))
Table 2: Allocations
The x good is now allocated as in Allen and Yannelis, and the problem of agent
3 knowing which direction to transfer wealth in the event {b, c} vanishes.
Yet it is unclear why agents 1 and 2 need agent 3. Suppose instead they were to
contract directly with each other. In particular, suppose that agent 1 promises to
give agent 3
m112(a) = m
1
12(b) = 10 m
1
12(c) = 0
and agent 2 promises to give agent 1
m121(a) = m
1
21(c) = 10 m
1
21(b) = 0.
The allocation of the x good for both agents would then be
(20, 10, 10)
For this scheme to be incentive compatible, agent 1 cannot benefit from reporting
the event {a, b} as {c}. In event {a, b}, agent 1’s expected utility from telling the
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truth is
1
2
(
20 +m221(a) +m
2
21(b)− 2m212(a) + 2
√
5 +
√
10
)
.
It seems natural to look for a solution where the transfers of the y good in state a
are zero, as the incentive problems are related to state c for agent 1 and state b for
agent 2. In this case, the expected utility for agent 1 of telling the truth becomes
10 +
2
√
5 +
√
10 +m221(b)
2
.
If agent 1 lies, then with probability 1/2, the true state is b, and agent 2 detects
the lie. In that case, the contract is void. Also with probability 1/2, the true state
is a, and the deception succeeds. Agent 1’s expected utility of lying to agent 2 is
therefore
u(e1(a)) · µ(b)
µ({a, b}) + u(e1(a) +m21(a)−m12(c)) ·
µ(a)
µ({a, b})
=
1
2
(
20 +m221(a)−m212(c) +
√
20 +
√
30
)
.
= 10 +
√
20 +
√
30 +m221(a)−m212(c)
2
.
Continuing with the assumption of no state a transfers of the y good, this becomes
10 +
2
√
5 +
√
30−m212(c)
2
,
so that the incentive compatibility condition requires
10 +
2
√
5 +
√
10 +m221(b)
2
≥ 10 + 2
√
5 +
√
30−m212(c)
2
. (9)
The symmetry of the problem makes it natural to look for a solution where m221(b) =
m212(c), and where the inequality (9) holds with equality. Then,
√
10 +m212(c) =
√
30−m212(c) ⇒ m221(b) = m212(c) =
√
30−√10
2
.
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The allocation is then
Agent State a State b State c
1 (20, 10) (10, 10 +
√
30−√10
2
) (10, 10−
√
30−√10
2
)
2 (20, 10) (10, 10−
√
30−√10
2
) (10, 10 +
√
30−√10
2
)
3 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
With this approach, although it turns out that the allocation
x1 = (16, 16, 4) x2 = (16, 4, 16) x3 = (8, 0, 0)
of the x good is attainable, this allocation is not in the core, because it is not
coalitionally stable. Agents 1 and 2 do not need the third agent to trade, so we need
to look elsewhere for a solution that would allow agent 3 to use his or her superior
information to his or her advantage.
The above TU game is similar in spirit to Fl˚am (2007), where agents have random
bilateral meetings and transfer goods in ways that increase their combined utilities.
A difference in his approach is that all individual trades or contracts honored by
an agent must be based on information that he can verify, i.e. all trade operates
through a sequence of (using my terminology) locally coarse cores.
Bilateral trade with short positions might aid in getting to a stable allocation.
This process could be construed as the spontaneous arising of financial instruments.
I pursue this idea in the next section, where I introduce financial securities in the
market in the Allen-Yannelis example 3.1 and show that the agents can indeed reach
the allocation:
x1 = (16, 16, 4) x2 = (16, 4, 16) x3 = (8, 0, 0)
and the solution will be stable as well as incentive compatible.
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4 Incomplete Financial Markets
4.1 Differential information economy as a financial market
Introducing uncertainty into the economy and allowing agents to write state-contingent
contracts creates a market for financial securities. Indeed, there are many similari-
ties between the differential information economy and financial asset markets. Both
specify:
• Consumption goods
• Time
• Uncertainty concerning what the state of the world is
• Information partitions
• Set of agents
• Endowments (which can depend on the time and on the state of nature)
• Utility functions
In addition, financial economies specify:
• Securities (financial assets)
So, whether we want to look at differential information economies as a coopera-
tive game or a financial asset market depends largely on our point of view. (See, for
example, Daher et al. (2007) or Koutsougeras (1998)). In cooperative games, we first
restrict attention to time, uncertainty, agents, endowments, utility functions, and
consumption goods. Then we pick the allocation that we think is reasonable. That
is, we do not specify budgets, equilibrium prices, or financial goods. Then we worry
about whether financial goods or something else can make this allocation arise. In
financial economics, by contrast, financial assets are specified from the outset, and
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if the financial market is thick enough, we can reach any core allocation, and all
markets are in equilibrium at the same time (general equilibrium). An exception
this is in some incomplete asset markets such as Hart (1975).
The basic idea behind financial markets is that people trade securities in order to
maximize their utility and reduce risk. The state-contingent contracts allow agents
to reduce risk by shifting their wealth between states (i.e., lose money in some states
in return for gaining money in other states). Since the agents’s utility functions are
concave in the consumption good x, agents are risk-averse and prefer to smooth
consumption over the possible states of nature.
Returning to the original Allen-Yannelis example 3.1, I introduce three types of
financial assets into the model: bonds, stocks, and mutual funds. I allow agents to
temporarily hold short positions and require actions to be privately measurable.
Example 4.1. Financial market with short sales:
Agents : i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}
Goods : There is only one good, x.
State space : Ω = {a, b, c}
Uncertainty : µ(a) = µ(b) = µ(c) = 1/3.
Endowments (in each state) :
e1 = (20, 20, 0) e2 = (20, 0, 20) e3 = (0, 0, 0)
Preferences : u(x) = x1/2.
Information fields:
F1 = {∅,Ω, {a, b}, {c}}
F2 = {∅,Ω, {a, c}, {b}}
F3 = {∅,Ω, {b, c}, {a}}
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As before, the following allocation is in the private core:
x1 = (16, 16, 4) x2 = (16, 4, 16) x3 = (8, 0, 0)
This allocation is feasible and Pareto-dominates other allocations including autarky,
but cannot be reached as a rational expectations equiblirium. However, if a suitable
mix of financial assets is introduced to the market, the agents will nevertheless be
able to trade to it.
The measurability constraint requires that each agent would only be willing to
trade an asset if it has same payoff in states he or she cannot distinguish. Therefore,
all three agents would be willing to trade a risk-free asset B (thought as a bond)
which pays 1 unit of the consumption good in each state.
B(a) = 1 B(b) = 1 B(c) = 1
Since agents are risk-averse, agents 1 and 2 prefer to insure themselves against
the state in which they receive nothing. That is, they would like to buy a financial
instrument that pays them one or more units of consumption good x in the state
where they receive nothing.
Suppose there are two stocks in the market: Sb, which pays one unit of the
consumption good x in state b, and Sc, which pays one unit of the consumption
good x in state c. The market then has three types of financial instruments whose
payoffs are as follows:
Asset State a State b State c
B 1 1 1
Sb 0 1 0
Sc 0 0 1
Table 3: Payoffs of the financial assets
Note that it is not necessary to introduce a state a stock that pays one unit
in state a and nothing in states b and c. The net effect of a state a stock can be
45
achieved by a mix of the other assets: buying one unit of the bond B and selling
one unit each of stocks Sb and Sc:
Asset State a State b State c
Sa 1 0 0
B − Sb − Sc 1-0-0 1-1-0 1-0-1
Sc 0 0 1
Table 4: Portfolio generating a state a stock
The three assets B, Sb and Sc create a full set of Arrow securities for each state
of nature in Ω.
Since the agents gain information about the realized state of nature after they
receive their endowment at the interim stage, the trading of these assets must occur
ex ante — before the agents receive their endowment. The question which immedi-
ately arises is then how the agents are able buy and sell assets before they have any
endowments. One solution would be to introduce a second good, y, into the model
to be used as money, just as in the three-agent transferable utility example 3.2, and
give each agent an initial endowment of y before they receive their endowment of
the consumption good x.
However, a simpler approach is to allow each agent to build a self-financing
portfolio of assets through short sales. The only restriction is then that the short
sales must generate enough revenue to cover the cost of purchasing the portfolio.
This is similar to placing orders with an online brokerage conditional on some other
assets selling at a certain price first.17
Looking at the problem from agent 1’s viewpoint, agent 1 wants to increase his
or her state c allocation over his or her endowment:
e1 = (20, 20, 0)
17Similar models are discussed in multiunit auction theory. A full treatment is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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and is willing to give up some consumption in the other states in exchange. Agent 1,
however, can only trade in the bond B and the state c stock Sc because they are the
only securities that are privately measurable to him or her. He or she will therefore
issue (sell short) a unit of the bond B and use the revenue to buy two shares of the
stock Sc. After the sale, his or her expected payoffs are:
Asset State a State b State c
2Sc −B 19 19 1
Balance -1 -1 1
Repeating this process four times, agent 1 gets to the allocation in Example 3.1:
Asset State a State b State c
8Sc − 4B 16 16 4
Similarly, agent 2 issues (sells short) four units of the bond B and uses the
revenue to buy eight shares of the stock Sb. His or her final allocation is then:
Asset State a State b State c
8Sb − 4B 16 4 16
If agent 3 had complete information, i.e. if his or her information partition were:
F3 = {∅,Ω, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}},
as in Example 3.3, he could issue eight shares of Sb and eight shares of Sc, and use
the revenue to buy the eight bonds on the market. His or her final allocation would
then be (8, 0, 0):
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Asset State a State b State c
8B − 8Sb − 8Sc 8 8B − 8Sb 8B − 8Sc
However, in this example, agent 3’s information partition is:
F3 = {∅,Ω, {b, c}, {a}}.
Since he or she cannot distinguish between states b and c, he or she cannot issue
the securities Sb and Sc directly. But what he or she can do is to create a mutual
fund Sbc that pays one unit of the consumption good x in the event {b, c}. Agents 1
and 2 then buy shares of this mutual fund with the revenue from selling their bond
certificates. They split the cost and the profits of the mutual fund evenly.
Agent 3’s final allocation will then still be (8, 0, 0):
Asset State a State b State c
8B − 8Sbc 8 8B − 8Sbc 8B − 8Sbc
This allocation is privately measurable to agent 3. Moreover, the payoff of the
mutual fund tells agents 1 and 2 whether the state is a, in which case the fund pays
nothing, or in {b, c}. Since both agents 2 and 3 can distinguish b and c once they
know that the state is not a, the mutual fund essentially reveals agent 3’s private
information.
The financial market enables the agents to get to the allocation in Example 3.1.
Yet it may seem strange to call this an equilibrium: agent 3 has a self-financing port-
folio that gives a positive payoff with nonzero probability. That is, agent 3 is taking
advantage of an arbitrage opportunity, which should not coexist with competitive
equilibrium.
One possible explanation is that because of asymmetric information, the market
is not competitive. Agents 1 and 2 increase their utilities by issuing the bonds and
buying the stocks or the mutual fund, enabling them to smooth their consumption.
Yet they do not take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity, which yields the state
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a good for free, even though their utilities are increasing in the state a good. This is
because they cannot. Agent 1 is the only party interested in Sc, and agent 2 is the
only party interested in Sb. If agent 1 were to try to issue the fund Sbc, he or she
could not find a customer in agent 3, and would not know when to pay off on it if
agent 2 were to purchase the fund. So the only way agents 1 and 2 can purchase any
assets is by issuing the bond, and agent 3 is the only one left to purchase the bonds.
That is, agent 3 is a monopsonist in the bond market and a monopolist in the stock
market. It is therefore unsurprising that the market does not reach a competitive
equilibrium.
This still leaves the problem that agent 3 has a finite demand for an arbitrage
opportunity: he or she can get the state a good for free, and has expected utility
that is strictly increasing in the state a good. So why be content with eight units
of the state a good? The reason is that demand for the stocks, and supply of the
bonds, is satiated: agents 1 and 2 only issue eight bond certificates and demand
only eight units of the mutual fund Sbc. That is, the limitation on arbitrage also
reflects that the market is not entirely competitive.
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5 Summary of results
There are allocations in the core of a differential information economy that are not
attainable as a Rational Expectations Equilibrium. This result seems to contradict
the First Welfare Theorem, which states that competitive equilibrium, in the absence
of externalities, is Pareto-optimal. This paper discusses various ways of how agents
might trade into such allocations.
I examine the coarse core, fine core, and the private core. In addition, I intro-
duce two refinements of the core of a differential information economy: the locally
coarse core and the action-measurable private core. The locally coarse core requires
that agents have information in common with their trading partners, but not neces-
sarily with everyone. The action-measurable private core requires measurability of
the agents’ actions rather than their allocations. Each of the core concepts leaves
something to be desired, and none achieves the optimal allocation in a three-agent
example when information is asymmetric and none of the agents has complete in-
formation. Some core concepts fail incentive compatibility, while others violate the
stability constraint.
Finally, I introduce financial securities into the differential information economy.
Through short sales and self-financing portfolios, the agents in a three-agent econ-
omy with asymmetric information are able trade into a private core allocation that
is Pareto-optimal, measurable, incentive compatible, and stable.
Thus, the financial market approach suggests that a core allocation might be
a reasonable prediction even if it cannot arise as rational expectations equilibrium.
There is limited arbitrage in the financial markets example I consider, but because of
the information asymmetries, the agents cannot fully exploit it. In other words, the
apparent conflict with the First Welfare Theorem reflects the fact that the market
is not fully competitive.
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